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Wollschlaeger, a Patient’s Right to Privacy,
and a Renewed Focus on Mental Health
Treatment
Chad A. Pasternack *
In response to doctors pushing gun control agendas on patients,
Florida enacted the Firearm Owners Privacy Act. The law,
upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of
Florida, protects patients from intrusive lines of inquiry
unrelated to their treatment and from discrimination due to
firearm ownership. While patients in Florida benefit greatly
from the Firearm Owners Privacy Act, this note argues for more
specific language in the law, which would parallel language in
the Florida Mental Health Act (“Baker Act”). The proposed
changes would limit inquiries into firearm ownership to
instances where there is a substantial likelihood of serious
bodily harm to the patient or others.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A young mother is concerned about a rash on her son, so she brings
him to a pediatrician. Once inside the examination room, the doctor asks
the mother a series of questions about her home, including whether she
owns any firearms. Bewildered about and uncomfortable with this
question, the mother refuses to answer and pleads with the doctor to
focus on her son instead. The doctor frowns, and then he advises the
mother that she will have thirty days to find a new pediatrician.
To a physician, the aforementioned scenario may be a reasonable
practice of preventive medicine. In fact, counseling patients on firearm
safety is a practice encouraged by the American Medical Association.1
But, the patient on the receiving end of the inquiry may feel vulnerable,
threatened, and violated. Particularly when a patient goes to a doctor for
a specific purpose, as opposed to for an ordinary wellness visit, it is
presumable that the patient neither expects nor desires such intrusive
inquiries in the name of preventive care. The physicians’ gun control
movement is a result of excessive media coverage of mass shootings and
inadequate treatment of the mentally ill.2 Instead of treating the root
causes of gun violence, such as mental illness and breakdown of the
family unit, “the public health establishment’s histrionic reflex is . . . to
control and confiscate.” 3
In response to this movement among healthcare providers, Florida
enacted a law that curtails doctors’ ability to question patients on
ownership or possession of firearms and ammunition, which is known as

1

Press Release, President Robert M. Wah, M.D., American Medical Association,
AMA Response to Court Ruling on Florida’s Gun Gag Law (July 28, 2014).
2
Vik Khanna, Why Public Health Needs a New Gun Doctrine, AMERICA’S 1ST
FREEDOM, Dec. 2014, at 64. While Khanna, a public health professional educated at the
Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Hygiene and Public Health, admittedly
believes the Second Amendment secures the rights of individuals to own firearms and
enjoys firearm ownership, he brings a level of fairness to the conversation by discussing
data that typically goes unreported. For instance, he noted a 2013 report produced by the
Institute of Medicine was ignored by the media. The report, ordered by the Centers for
Disease Control, concluded that defensive uses of firearms occur more than previously
recognized, firearm ownership is a crime deterrent, and unauthorized possession of a
firearm is a crucial driver of gun related violence. Id.
3
Id.
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the Firearm Owners Privacy Act. 4 Essentially, the law dictates limits on
preventive medicine in regards to firearms. This note will show that the
Firearm Owners Privacy Act is indeed a valid regulation of healthcare.
To clarify, this note will not discuss the Second Amendment, gun
control, or gun rights. 5
First, this note will explore the evolution of healthcare regulation.
Part II will begin with a brief discussion of a few major developments in
regulation at the federal level. In particular, regulations pertaining to
tobacco usage and Medicare will be used to show how healthcare
regulations came about and gained acceptance, and the faculty the
federal government has to impose such regulations. Along with the
development of regulations, the advancement and changing nature of
healthcare itself will be discussed. This note will focus on how mental
health treatment, using preventive medicine as a backdrop, has advanced
since the mid-1900s. After discussing healthcare at the macro-level, this
note will narrow its focus to regulations in Florida, namely the Baker
Act 6 and regulations of patient medical records.
Second, there will be a thorough analysis of the Firearm Owners
Privacy Act. Part III will include both an analysis of the plain text of the
law and its legislative history. Then, this note will examine the
implications of the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the Act in
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida.
Third, this note will propose changes to the Firearm Owners Privacy
Act based on its legislative history and the Baker Act. As enacted, the
Firearm Owners Privacy Act fails to effectuate its intended purpose,
which is to protect the rights of patients by prohibiting agenda-driven
inquiries into firearm ownership. 7 In particular, Section 790.338 should
be amended so that the exception to the general prohibition of inquiry
4

See infra Part III.B; 2011 Fla. Laws 112 (codified at FLA. STATS. §§ 790.338,
381.026, 456.072 (2014)).
5
For more information on these issues, see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742 (2010) (holding the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated
by the Fourteenth Amendment and applicable to the states); District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding the Second Amendment confers an individual right
to keep and bear arms); Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014)
(holding “the right to keep and bear arms includes the right to carry an operable firearm
outside the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense”); Palmer v. District of
Columbia, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, Case No. 1:09-CV-1482, 2014 WL 3702854 (D.D.C.
July 24, 2014) (holding Washington D.C.’s complete ban on the carrying of firearms
outside the home is unconstitutional); Julie Morgan, Back to the Basics: Restoration of
Our Right to Keep and Bear Arms Through a National Reciprocity Act, 21 U. MIAMI BUS.
L. REV. 223 (2013) (discussing the constitutionality and need for a national concealedcarry reciprocity law).
6
Florida Mental Health Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 394.451-394.47891 (2014).
7
See infra Part III.B.

454

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:451

into firearm ownership requires a good faith belief that there is a
substantial likelihood of harm, instead of only relevance to the patient’s
medical care or safety.

II. PRIOR REGULATION OF HEALTHCARE
Like any regulatory scheme, the American healthcare system has
developed slowly. If the regulations in effect today were unilaterally
imposed overnight, rather than after years of piecemeal evolution, such
regulations would have been rejected. But, “[s]light encroachments
create new boundaries from which legions of power can seek new
territory to capture.” 8 Concurrent with the evolution of healthcare
regulation, the very definition of “healthcare” has undergone change. A
brief history of these developments will provide the necessary context for
an analysis of our present state of healthcare regulation.

A. A Brief History of Federal Healthcare Regulation
In the mid-twentieth century, the federal government directed an
unprecedented amount of its attention towards the nation’s healthcare.
Two initiatives in particular were monumental in crafting our present
healthcare system: the Surgeon General’s 1964 report on smoking and
health, and the creation of Medicare and Medicaid. The former, a
landmark step in policymaking, and the latter, landmark steps in social
insurance, are prototypical of federal healthcare regulation.

1. Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and Health
The government’s first major push in its effort to expand healthcare
regulation began in 1964 with the Surgeon General’s report, Smoking
and Health. 9 The report opened with a simple question that held farreaching effects: “[I]s the use of tobacco bad or good for health, or
devoid of effects on health?” 10 Unlike today, the carcinogenic effects of
smoking were not common knowledge in the 1960s, nor were they
proven scientifically by reliable research methods.
In the early pages of the report, the Surgeon General discussed the
problem that plagues most scientific research—causality. Whereas
finding a correlation is merely finding a relation between phenomena, 11
8

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39 (1957).
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING & HEALTH: REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964)
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL REPORT].
10
Id. at 5.
11
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 280 (11th ed. 2003).
9
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causation is “an act or agency which produces an effect.” 12 The report
noted, “thoughts about causality in the realm of this inquiry were
constantly and inevitably aroused in the minds of the members because
they were preoccupied with the subject of their investigation—‘Smoking
and Health.’” 13 Causality was determined by analyzing the effect or noneffect of tobacco on the user’s tissues, organs, and other qualities that
may affect the user’s health, for better or worse. 14
Scientific methods aside, the importance of the report flows from its
findings. It found that the habitual use of tobacco is primarily related to
the addictive nature of nicotine.15 Average smokers had nine to tenfold
increases in risk of developing lung cancer, and heavy smokers had
upwards of a twenty-fold risk increase. 16 The report stated its conclusion
succinctly: “[o]n the basis of prolonged study and evaluation of many
lines of converging evidence, the Committee makes the following
judgment: Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of significant importance
in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.”17
Once presented with this conclusion, it was only a matter of time
before Congress acted. That action came in 1965 in the form of the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. 18 The Act made it
unlawful “for any person to manufacturer, import, or package for sale or
distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which
fails to bear the following statement: ‘Caution: Cigarette Smoking May
Be Hazardous to Your Health.’” 19 While this warning brought public
attention to the effects of cigarette smoking, the language was weak and
limited only to the package itself. Accordingly, Congress enacted the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 20 which required stronger
language to be put on packaging. It prohibited advertising cigarettes on
any medium of electronic communication that is regulated by the Federal
Communications Commission. 21 Additionally, it required annual
reporting to Congress by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
regarding information and recommendations related to smoking, 22 as
12

Id. at 196.
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 20.
14
Id. at 21.
15
Id. at 32.
16
Id. at 31.
17
Id. at 33.
18
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2012)).
19
Id. § 4.
20
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2012)).
21
Id. § 6.
22
Id. § 8(a).
13
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well as annual reporting by the Federal Trade Commission of the
effectiveness of cigarette labeling and current practices of advertising. 23
The aforementioned series of events set precedent for healthcare
regulation. The Surgeon General conducted research and declared that
the evidence revealed cigarette smoking to be a health hazard and matter
of public concern. 24 Within only a few years, the tobacco industry was
being regulated by the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, and the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare. 25

2. Creation of Medicare and Medicaid
The 1960s was a busy decade in the healthcare arena. In addition to
combating the perils of smoking, Congress expanded access to healthcare
by establishing Medicare and Medicaid through the Social Security
Amendments of 1965. 26 As originally enacted, Medicare provided health
insurance for individuals who attained the age of 65 and were entitled to
Social Security benefits or were qualified railroad retirement
beneficiaries.27 Medicare coverage includes both hospital insurance and
supplementary medical insurance. As for Medicaid, it was created to
enable the States to provide medical assistance to “families with
dependent children and of aged, blind, or permanently and totally
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to
meet the costs of necessary medical services,” as well as rehabilitation
and other services to help beneficiaries attain independence.28
The Social Security Amendments of 1965 explicitly prohibit federal
interference:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize any
Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision
or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in
which medical services are provided, or over the
23

Id. § 8(b).
My discussion of the Surgeon General’s report and its effects on policy should not
be interpreted as being critical of either the findings of the report nor of the legislative
response. Neither of these matters is of concern to this note. Rather, the cigarette smoking
legislation is a paradigm of how matters once not thought to be health concerns can
quickly morph into leading health concerns, and how the legislative response can be
broader in scope than the traditional components of healthcare, i.e., the doctor-patient
relationship.
25
Known today as the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
26
Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396v (2012)).
27
Id. § 101.
28
Id. § 121.
24
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selection, tenure, or compensation of any officer or
employee of any institution, agency, or person providing
health services; or to exercise any supervision or control
over the administration or operation of any such
institution, agency, or person. 29
That said, this prohibition is more appropriately described as a
prohibition of direct control over the practice of medicine. In other
words, the ability to indirectly control is retained through the power to
regulate: “The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the administration of the insurance programs under
this title.” 30
Before proceeding into any further discussion of how healthcare is
regulated through Medicare and Medicaid, this note must clarify that
healthcare providers choose to accept Medicare and Medicaid, thereby
agreeing to regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services. 31 Even though hospitals and doctors are typically
referred to as some variation of the phrase “healthcare provider,” they are
businesses and businessmen, respectively. By not accepting Medicare
and Medicaid, these healthcare providers would turn away a significant
source of revenue. Therefore, it is persuasive for healthcare providers to
accept Medicare and Medicaid and to submit to federal regulation.
Because this discussion is meant to be a superficial exploration into
Medicare and Medicaid, the only regulations that will be discussed are
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(“EMTALA”) 32 and the use of diagnosis-related groups (“DRG”).
EMTALA applies to “participating hospitals” that have “entered into a
provider agreement under Section 1395cc,” 33 which is the agreement to
participate in and receive payments from Medicare. Therefore, in order
to access the segment of the market that consists of Medicare patients,
hospitals agree, pursuant to EMTALA, to provide a screening
examination and stabilizing treatment to any individual who comes to the
hospital’s emergency department, regardless of whether the individual is

29

Id. § 102.
Id.
31
See Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 134
(N.D. Ill. 1975) aff’d Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Mathews, 423 U.S. 975
(1975) (“each individual physician and practitioner has the ability to choose whether or
not to participate in the [Medicare] program. It is true that there will exist economic
incentive or inducement to participate in the program. However, such inducement is not
tantamount to coercion or duress”).
32
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
33
§ 1395dd(e)(2).
30
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eligible for Medicare benefits.34 In order to enforce the requirements of
the statute, it authorizes a civil money penalty of up to $50,000 and may
exclude doctors from participation in Medicare and Medicaid programs
for flagrant or repeated offenses. 35
A second type of regulation imposed on healthcare providers through
Medicare is the use of a prospective payer system that reimburses
hospitals based on diagnoses, not actual cost. 36 By reimbursing hospitals
through DRGs, which are classifications of different diagnoses and
procedures, the government forces hospitals to match their costs to the
expected reimbursement.
Under cost-based reimbursement, each hospital was
treated as a singular entity entitled to receive its unique
costs of treating Medicare patients. In contrast, under
DRG-based reimbursement, each hospital is treated as a
member of a group and it is entitled to reimbursement
only by virtue of its status as part of that group. Each
hospital receives reimbursement for the average of a
type of case in an average class of hospitals in an
average location. 37
As a result, hospitals are incentivized to cut costs, which may occur at
the expense of patients’ treatment. For example, reducing lengths of
patient stays reduces costs, but also inhibits physicians’ abilities to
monitor patient recoveries. 38 Yet the incentives resultant from fixed
reimbursement go beyond increasing efficiency. A hospital that cannot
match its costs to the reimbursement would suffer a loss; and conversely,
a hospital that can treat a patient for less than the prospective payment
will turn a profit. 39 Regardless of the wisdom of this tradeoff, the federal
34
§ 1395dd(a)-(b). This note is not critical of EMTALA. EMTALA saves lives. Yet,
EMTALA is a prime example of how regulations can be imposed on healthcare providers
by the federal government through healthcare providers’ acceptance of Medicare and
Medicaid.
35
§ 1395dd(d).
36
See David M. Frankford, The Complexity of Medicare’s Hospital Reimbursement
System: Paradoxes of Averaging, 78 IOWA L. REV. 517, 570-71 (1993).
37
Id. at 577.
38
For a more thorough analysis of the effects of a prospective payment system on
hospital behavior, see Martin F. Grace & Jean M. Mitchell, Regulation of Health Care
Costs: The Implications of the Prospective Payment Reimbursement System, 2 U. FLA. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 125 (1989).
39
Pamela H. Bucy, Health Care Reform and Fraud by Health Care Providers, 38
VILL. L. REV. 1003, 1015 (1993) (arguing that DRGs have encouraged fraud, including
cost shifting to non-Medicare patients, false reporting of costs, and false diagnoses of
patients).
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government, by being the insurer of such a large segment of the
population, is able to place controls on hospital behavior so as to reduce
its own costs. While the government cannot directly control the practice
of medicine, its role as insurer gives it considerable influence over
healthcare practitioners. By controlling the money, the government is
able to regulate the process.

B. Changing Definition of Healthcare
Healthcare n: the field concerned with the maintenance
or restoration of the health of the body or mind.40
Webster’s published this definition in 1998. In 2004, Webster’s
published the following definition:
Healthcare n: the provision of medical and related
services aimed at maintaining good health, especially
through the prevention and treatment of disease.41
As medical science continually improves, what we consider
“healthcare” will continually change. For example, look to the use of
antihistamines to treat allergies. Prior to the 1900s, little was known
about allergic reactions.42 Over the course of a few decades, scientists
learned how allergens affect the body. By the early 1940s, antihistamines
were invented and administered. Side effects of these early drugs
included sedation and dry mouth. 43 While one can function with dry
mouth, sedation is more inhibiting. Fortunately, by the 1980s,
pharmaceutical companies were able to produce non-sedative
antihistamines.44 In under a century, people went from experiencing
unexplained physiological reactions to understanding that their reactions
are caused by “allergies,” which can be treated with over-the-counter
medication.
In order to maintain the relevancy of how different areas of
healthcare have developed, this note will only discuss the shift to
preventive medicine and changes in mental health treatment.

40

WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 882 (2d ed. 1998).
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 867 (2d ed. 2004).
42
M.B. Emanuel, Histamine and the Antiallergic Antihistamines: A History of Their
Discoveries, 29 CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ALLERGY, 1 (Supp. 3 1999).
43
Id. at 9.
44
Id.
41
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1. Preventive Medicine
Stated simply, preventive medicine is a mixture of science and
philosophy that encourages patients to be proactive in maintaining their
health. Instead of merely treating conditions as they occur, practitioners
of preventive medicine are more forward looking in their approach to
patient treatment. By treating conditions sooner or by controlling risk
factors, health outcomes improve and costs decrease.
Preventive medicine can be broken down into three levels: primary
prevention, secondary prevention, and tertiary prevention.45 At the
primary prevention level, the goal is to keep new problems from
developing. This can be accomplished through the use of vaccines and
immunization programs, or by making lifestyle changes, such as
exercising, quitting smoking, and reducing alcohol consumption.
Preventive medicine is always forward looking—lose weight and stop
smoking now to reduce the risk of developing heart disease later.
Despite a patient’s best efforts, some conditions are not preventable.
But, with secondary prevention, conditions can be detected early and
treated promptly. 46 Wellness visits to physicians are encouraged because
many conditions are asymptomatic.47 Examples of conditions that are
commonly detected and treated at this stage of care are breast cancer,
hypertension, high cholesterol, and skin cancer. 48 Unlike the primary
prevention stage, the goal here is to prevent the condition from
advancing to a point where it causes health to deteriorate.
Along the same lines, the objective of tertiary prevention is to
prevent existing conditions from worsening, often through treatment,
rehabilitation, or surgery. 49 Although there is much debate over whether
this is in fact preventive medicine and not purely reactive medicine, the
conditions dealt with are typically progressive, so the focus remains on
the future. 50

2. Mental Health
Over the past half-century, the mental health system in the United
States has undergone a dramatic transformation. Prior to the 1960s,
mental health treatment consisted, in large part, of detention in state

45

William Rakowski, The Definition and Measurement of Prevention, Preventive
Healthcare, and Health Promotion, 18 GENERATIONS 18 (Spring 1994).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
See id.
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mental hospitals, 51 otherwise known as asylums. During the
deinstitutionalization movement that took place between 1955 and 1980,
over 400,000 people were released from mental hospitals.52 Afterwards,
attention turned to community support programs, which had goals of
continuous community treatment and support services, as well as
assertive crisis and outreach services. 53 Instead of focusing on
containment and restraint, the newer system emphasized rehabilitation.
Patients were taught social skills and skills that support independent
living and employment. 54
By the 1990s, the mental health system transformed again, this time
to focus on recovery. “Central to recovery principles is the idea that
people can live meaningful and personally satisfying lives without the
complete elimination of psychiatric symptoms.” 55 Because the current
focus is on helping patients recover, healthcare providers and related
organizations spend large amounts on outreach initiatives so that more
people seek and receive treatment.56 A study of data from the Veterans
Health Administration from 1997 to 2005 shows a significant increase in
usage of mental health services. During that period, there was a 7%
annual growth in usage, 57 and the number of veterans who received at
least one mental health contact increased 117.6%. 58
The current mental health landscape involves three main changes: (1)
focusing on health rather than illness,59 (2) reducing negative stigmas
associated with mental health treatment,60 and (3) increasing
collaboration between primary care and mental health.61 Together, these
changes are designed to make mental health treatment both more
accessible to more people and to make more people willing to seek and
51
Catherine H. Stein et al, Mental Health System Historians: Adults with
Schizophrenia Describe Changes in Community Mental Health Care Over Time, 85
PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY 3 (Oct. 2, 2014).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Eric D. A. Hermes et al, Recent Trends in the Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder and Other Mental Disorders in the VHA, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 471, 472 (May
2012).
57
Id. at 471.
58
Id. at 472.
59
A. Kathryn Power, Focus on Transformation: A Public Health Model of Mental
Health for the 21st Century, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 580 (May 2009).
60
Eric R. Pedersen & Andrew P. Paves, Comparing Perceived Public Stigma and
Personal Stigma of Mental Health Treatment Seeking in a Young Adult Sample, 219
PSYCHIATRY RES. 143 (2014).
61
Stephen Petterson et al, Mental Health Treatment in the Primary Care Setting:
Patterns and Pathways, 32 FAMILIES, SYSTEMS, & HEALTH 157 (June 2014).
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receive treatment. The focus on health, rather than illness, and the goal of
reducing negative stigmas are part of an attitudinal change in medicine,
which corresponds closely to the rise in preventive medicine. The
modern healthcare attitude, which is gaining acceptance, is that going to
a doctor should be a routine part of life and that doing so allows us to
live better and longer.

C. Regulation in Florida
Our discussion thus far has been on healthcare at the national level.
Most healthcare regulation, however, is imposed at the state level. 62 In
Florida, most laws regulating healthcare can be found in Title XXIX,
Public Health, and Title XXXII, Regulation of Professionals and
Occupations, of the Florida Statutes. This note will limit its discussion to
those statutes pertaining to mental health treatment and medical records.

1. The Baker Act
The Florida Mental Health Act, more commonly known as the Baker
Act, establishes the state’s goals and policies for mental health
treatment.63 In passing the Baker Act, it was “the intent of the
Legislature . . . to evaluate, research, plan and recommend . . . programs
designed to reduce the occurrence, severity, duration, and disabling
aspects of mental, emotional, and behavioral disorders.” 64 There is a
clear policy favoring medical treatment, rather than predeinstitutionalization-style containment.
Treatment programs “shall include, but [are] not limited to,
comprehensive health, social, educational, and rehabilitative services to
persons requiring intensive short-term and continued treatment in order
to encourage them to assume responsibility for their treatment and
recovery.” 65 The goal is to help patients recover and lead meaningful
lives. But, that can be a difficult goal to attain considering that many
suffering from mental health conditions either go undiagnosed or will not
consent to treatment. In such circumstances, it is the intent of the
Legislature
that any involuntary treatment or examination be
accomplished in a setting which is clinically appropriate
and most likely to facilitate the person’s return to the
community as soon as possible; and that individual
62
63
64
65

See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Florida Mental Health Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 394.451-394.47891 (2014).
FLA. STAT. § 394.453 (2014).
Id.
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dignity and human rights be guaranteed to all persons
who are admitted to mental health facilities or who are
being held [for involuntary examination]. 66
Yet, even when treating or examining an involuntary patient, restraint
and seclusion is justified only in response to imminent danger to the
patient or others. 67
Along the same vein of legislation geared towards the treatment of
communicable diseases, the Baker Act recognizes the competing
interests of the patient and the public in mental health treatment: (1) the
patient recovering and functioning in society, and (2) protecting the
public from people who are dangerous due to their mental illnesses.
Mental health is defined as a person’s “state of mind characterized by
emotional well-being, good behavioral adjustment, relative freedom from
anxiety and disabling symptoms, and a capacity to establish constructive
relationships and cope with the ordinary demands and stresses of life.” 68
Treatment, on the other hand, is “the administration of appropriate
measures (e.g., drugs, surgery, therapy) that are designed to relieve a
pathological condition.” 69 Therefore, the missing component of the
equation is mental illness. The Baker Act defines mental illness as “an
impairment of the mental or emotional processes that exercise conscious
control of one’s actions or of the ability to perceive or understand reality,
which impairment substantially interferes with the person’s ability to
meet the ordinary demands of living.” 70 However, developmental
disabilities, intoxication, and conditions manifested only by antisocial
behavior 71 or substance abuse are not included as mental illnesses.
As previously discussed, EMTALA requires hospitals that have
entered into Medicare provider agreements to provide stabilizing
treatment to all individuals who enter the hospital’s emergency
department, regardless of their ability to pay. 72 The value society places
on human life is greater than the value it places on emergency stabilizing

66

Id.
Id.
68
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 568 (1st ed.
2007) [hereinafter APA DICTIONARY].
69
Id. at 956.
70
FLA. STAT. § 394.455(18) (2014).
71
Antisocial behavior is defined as “aggressive, impulsive, and sometimes violent
actions that violate the established rules, conventions, and codes of a society, such as the
laws upholding personal and property rights.” APA DICTIONARY, supra note 68, at 62.
72
See supra Part II.A.2.
67
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treatment. 73 Like EMTALA, the Baker Act grants patients the right to
treatment. “A person shall not be denied treatment for mental illness and
services shall not be delayed at a receiving or treatment facility because
of inability to pay.” 74 But, after mental health services are provided,
hospitals are entitled to make every reasonable effort to collect
appropriate reimbursement—they simply cannot condition treatment on
payment. 75 Particularly because people with mental illnesses may be a
danger to themselves or others, public policy dictates that they receive
prompt treatment.
Dangerous mentally ill patients, however, do not always seek
treatment when they should. Accordingly, the Baker Act provides for
involuntary examination and placement. A person can be compelled to
undergo examination if,
[w]ithout care or treatment, the person is likely to suffer
from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself; such
neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of
substantial harm to his or her well-being; and it is not
apparent that such harm may be avoided through the
help of willing family members or friends or the
provision of other services; or . . . [t]here is a substantial
likelihood that without care or treatment the person will
cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or others
in the near future, as evidenced by recent behavior.76
An involuntary examination is a drastic measure, but it is a necessary
step to save lives, i.e., it is the preliminary step to involuntary placement.
A person may be placed in involuntary inpatient placement if “[t]here is
substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she will inflict serious
bodily harm on himself or herself or another person, as evidenced by
recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm.” 77 People
73
Therefore, providing a patient emergency treatment for mental illness is the
functional equivalent of providing life-saving treatment to a patient in an emergency
department. In effect, they are both lifesaving measures.
74
FLA. STAT. § 394.459 (2014).
75
§ 394.459(2)(a).
76
FLA. STAT. § 394.463(1)(b) (2014). The statute also requires that either the person
refused examination after conscientious disclosure of the purpose of examination, or the
person is unable to determine for himself or herself whether the examination is necessary.
§ 394.463(1)(a).
77
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)(a) (2014). In addition, criteria for involuntary inpatient
placement requires the person be mentally ill, and refuse or be unable to determine
whether voluntary placement is necessary. Instead of a substantial likelihood of inflicting
harm, a person may be placed in involuntary placement if he or she is manifestly
incapable of surviving alone or with the help of family and friends. In all circumstances,
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who continually exhibit behavior that qualifies them for involuntary
inpatient placement may be placed into involuntary outpatient
placement. 78 While the Baker Act does have the “teeth” necessary to
protect mentally ill patients from inflicting harm on themselves or others,
its ultimate goal remains helping patients recover.79

2. Patient Records
Under Florida law, a patient’s medical records are confidential.80 The
information contained in medical records is personal, and by prohibiting
disclosure, the patient’s privacy, along with the sanctity of the doctorpatient relationship, is protected. Without privacy protections, patients
may be reluctant to seek treatment or be forthright with their doctors, for
fear that third parties may stumble upon that information. Accordingly,
in Florida, medical “records may not be furnished to, and the medical
condition of a patient may not be discussed with, any person other than
the patient, the patient’s legal representative, or other health care
practitioners and providers involved in the patient’s care or treatment,
except upon written authorization from the patient.”81
In spite of the need to protect the privacy of patients, there are
exceptions to the rule. For instance, medical records may be disclosed
without written authorization to “any person, firm, or corporation that
has procured or furnished such care or treatment with the patient’s
consent” 82; when compulsory physical examination is made during the
course and scope of litigation 83; “[i]n any civil or criminal action, unless
otherwise prohibited by law, upon the issuance of a subpoena from a
court of competent jurisdiction and proper notice to the patient or the
patient’s legal representative by the party seeking such records”84; or to a
healthcare provider’s attorney in a medical negligence action.85
Whether the purposes of the exceptions to the rule are for economic
and judicial efficiency or because they present equitable solutions, the
effect is that patient records may be disclosed without authorization and
over the objection of the patient. Even though patients have relatively
strong federal privacy protections regarding their medical records, under
all available less restrictive alternatives must have been judged to be inappropriate. See
§ 394.467(1).
78
FLA. STAT. § 394.4655 (2014).
79
See FLA. STAT. § 394.4573 (2014).
80
See FLA. STAT. § 456.057 (2014).
81
§ 456.057(7).
82
§ 456.057(7)(a)(1).
83
§ 456.057(7)(a)(2).
84
§ 456.057(7)(a)(3).
85
§ 456.057(7)(a)(d).
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Florida law, they face the risk, in certain circumstances, of having their
medical records disclosed to third-parties.

III. FIREARM OWNERS PRIVACY ACT
On June 2, 2011, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed the Firearm
Owners Privacy Act into law. 86 The law, often referred to as the “Docs
vs. Glocks” law, protects patients’ privacy by restricting inquiry into
firearm ownership and prohibiting discrimination by physicians against
patients due to firearm ownership. 87 Four days after being signed into
law, several physicians’ groups initiated litigation seeking an injunction
to enjoin enforcement and a declaration that the law is unconstitutional.88
Thereafter, the district court issued its opinion in Wollschlaeger v.
Farmer (the “District Court Opinion”), enjoining the State from
enforcing the majority of the law.89
In the District Court Opinion, the court noted “as part of the practice
of preventive medicine, practitioners routinely ask and counsel patients
about a number of potential health and safety risks, including household
chemicals, swimming pools, drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and firearms.” 90 For
this reason, both the American College of Physicians and its Florida
chapter argued that a physician has an obligation to provide preventive
injury counseling on firearm safety. 91
Ultimately, the court granted the plaintiffs’ injunction based on its
finding that the Firearm Owners Privacy Act is unconstitutional due to
vagueness. 92 The constitutionality of the Firearm Owners Privacy Act,
however, was upheld on appeal, and the District Court Opinion was
reversed. 93 Consequently, the focus of this note will be on the
effectiveness of the law—not its constitutionality.

A. Language of the Act
By enacting the Firearm Owners Privacy Act, the Florida Legislature
created or amended three statutes: Section 790.338, Medical privacy
concerning firearms, prohibitions, penalties, exceptions; Section

86

2011 Fla. Laws 112.
See infra Parts III.A, C.
88
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F.
Supp. 2d 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
89
Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
90
Id. at 1257.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 1267-69.
93
See infra Part III.C.
87
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381.026, Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities; and
Section 456.072, Grounds for discipline, penalties, enforcement.94
First, Section 790.338, although grounded in the actions of
healthcare practitioners, is located in Chapter 790 of the Florida Statutes,
which is entitled “Weapons and Firearms.” 95 If a significant portion of
the Act is located in the chapter on Weapons and Firearms, then is the
law a regulation of healthcare or a regulation of firearms? Despite the
location of the restrictions on physician conduct in the Florida Statutes,
the statute is a regulation of healthcare. This note contends that the
deliberate placement of this part of the Firearm Owners Privacy Act was
a strategic decision to emphasize the rights of firearm owners as
patients—the majority of the Act is patient-centric—and not merely to
dictate what healthcare providers can or cannot do.
Section 790.338 begins by prohibiting healthcare providers and
facilities from “intentionally [entering] any disclosed information
concerning firearm ownership into the patient’s medical record if the
practitioner knows that such information is not relevant to the patient’s
medical care of safety, or the safety of others.” 96 The central theme of the
statute is relevance. If the information is not relevant, then it need not be
entered into a patient’s medical records. Considering that patient medical
records may, under certain circumstances, be disclosed without the
patient’s authorization, Section 790.338(1) protects the patient’s privacy
in personal information unrelated to his or her treatment.
Next, Section 790.338 instructs healthcare providers on making
inquiries into firearm ownership and possession:
(2)
A health care practitioner licensed under chapter
456 or a health care facility licensed under chapter 395
shall respect a patient’s right to privacy and should
refrain from making a written inquiry or asking
questions concerning the ownership of a firearm or
ammunition by the patient or by a family member of the
patient, or the presence of a firearm in a private home or
other domicile of the patient or a family member of the
patient. Notwithstanding this provision, a health care
practitioner or health care facility that in good faith
believes that this information is relevant to the patient’s
medical care or safety, or the safety of others, may make
such a verbal or written inquiry.
94
95
96

2011 Fla. Laws 112.
FLA. STAT. Chapter 790 (2014).
FLA. STAT. § 790.338(1) (2014).
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(3)
Any emergency medical technician or paramedic
acting under the supervision of an emergency medical
services medical director under chapter 401 may make
an inquiry concerning the possession or presence of a
firearm if he or she, in good faith, believes that
information regarding the possession of a firearm by the
patient or the presence of a firearm in the home or
domicile of a patient or a patient’s family member is
necessary to treat a patient during the course and scope
of a medical emergency or that the presence or
possession of a firearm would pose an imminent danger
or threat to the patient or others.97
Upon reading subsection (2), one is left to ponder, what does it mean to
have a good faith belief that information regarding firearm ownership or
possession is relevant to a patient’s medical care or safety, or the safety
of others? The juxtaposition of these two subsections enables application
of the interpretive maxim noscitur a sociis—“a word may be known by
the company it keeps.” 98 Subsection (3) uses the phrase “a firearm would
pose an imminent danger or threat to the patient or others.” 99 By
choosing to use this phrase in subsection (3) but not in subsection (2), the
Legislature must have decided that an “imminent danger or threat to the
patient or others” is not a necessary prerequisite for a healthcare provider
to have a good faith belief that an inquiry is relevant to a patient’s
medical care or safety. So, what is necessary? If a physician maintains a
generalized belief that firearms are dangerous and are a threat to the
patient’s and others’ safety, may the physician make the inquiry? What if
the physician does not maintain such a generalized belief, but instead,
treats a clumsy patient? May the physician, concerned that the clumsy
patient will unintentionally discharge a firearm, make the inquiry then?
The remainder of Section 790.338 is less troublesome in interpreting:
(4)
A patient may decline to answer or provide any
information regarding ownership of a firearm by the
patient or a family member of the patient, or the
presence of a firearm in the domicile of the patient or a
family member of the patient. A patient’s decision not to
answer a question relating to the presence or ownership
of a firearm does not alter existing law regarding a
physician’s authorization to choose his or her patients.
97
98
99

§§ 790.338(2)-(3).
Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923).
§ 790.338(3).
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(5)
A health care practitioner licensed under chapter
456 or a health care facility licensed under chapter 395
may not discriminate against a patient based solely upon
the patient’s exercise of the constitutional right to own
and possess firearms or ammunition.
(6)
A health care practitioner licensed under chapter
456 or a health care facility licensed under chapter 395
shall respect a patient’s legal right to own or possess a
firearm and should refrain from unnecessarily harassing
a patient about firearm ownership during an
examination.
(7)
An insurer issuing any type of insurance policy
pursuant to chapter 627 may not deny coverage, increase
any premium, or otherwise discriminate against any
insured or applicant for insurance on the basis of or upon
reliance upon the lawful ownership or possession of a
firearm or ammunition or the lawful use or storage of a
firearm or ammunition. Nothing herein shall prevent an
insurer from considering the fair market value of
firearms or ammunition in the setting of premiums for
scheduled personal property coverage. 100
In effect, the preceding subsections create a “protected class” of firearm
owners in terms of how healthcare providers may treat them. Like an
employment relationship, a physician may terminate the doctor-patient
relationship at will. In spite of the at-will nature of the relationship,
doctors are no longer free to use firearm ownership as a cause for
termination of the relationship.101 Further, because of the discrimination
provision, doctors may not charge firearm owners more, make firearm
owners wait longer, limit the days in which firearm owners may schedule
appointments, or carry out any other discriminatory practices against
firearm owners.
Subsection (6) leaves some room for the imagination. It deals with
unnecessary harassment, so unlike the subsections before it, it does not
100

§§ 790.338(4)-(7).
Admittedly, this is a somewhat inaccurate statement of the law. See Wollschlaeger
v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1264-65 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“the State itself
acknowledges that the law does not prevent a physician from terminating the doctorpatient relationship”). It does not alter existing law pertaining to termination of the
doctor-patient relationship, but by terminating the relationship because of firearm
ownership, the doctor is subject to discipline. By being subject to discipline, the doctor
can terminate the relationship, but is not free to do so.
101
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necessarily pertain to inquiry. By its language, it is not clear if the
subsection prohibits anything, or is merely a recommendation. In the
former clause, 102 the term “shall” is used, which means “[h]as a duty to;
more broadly, is required to.” 103 On the other hand, the latter clause 104
uses the term “should,” which does not possess significant legal meaning
and is not defined in Black’s Law Dictionary. 105 Was this merely an
oversight on the part of the drafters, or was it their intention that the
latter clause be a recommendation?
As for subsection (7), the Legislature foreclosed on any argument
that firearm ownership makes a firearm owner an inherently riskier
candidate for insurance. The Legislature then concluded Section 790.338
with subsection (8), which designates violations of subsections (1)-(4) as
grounds for discipline. 106
Second, Section 381.026, the Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities, 107 was amended to add several provisions
complementary to those already discussed. If the amendment of Chapter
790 left any doubt that the Firearm Owners Privacy Act is a regulation of
healthcare, the amendment of Section 381.026 should eliminate that
uncertainty. Subsections (2), (4), (5), and (6) of Section 790.338 have
counterparts in Section 381.026, wherein they are subsections (8), (9),
(10), and (11), respectively. 108
Third, Section 456.072 was amended to give teeth to the Firearm
Owners Privacy Act. Now, violations of any of the provisions of Section
790.338 constitute grounds for discipline.109

B. Legislative History
Recall the earlier hypothetical in which a young mother who refused
to answer a pediatrician’s question about firearm ownership was told to
find a new doctor. 110 A similar scenario unfolded in Ocala, Florida. 111
102

§ 790.338(6) (“A health care practitioner licensed under chapter 456 or a health care
facility licensed under chapter 395 shall respect a patient’s legal right to own or possess a
firearm”) (emphasis added).
103
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1585 (10th ed. 2014).
104
§ 790.338(6) (“A health care practitioner licensed under chapter 456 or a health care
facility licensed under chapter 395 . . . should refrain from unnecessarily harassing a
patient about firearm ownership during an examination.”) (emphasis added).
105
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
106
§ 790.338(8).
107
Florida Patient’s Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, FLA. STAT. § 381.026 (2014).
108
§§ 381.026(8)-(11) (2014).
109
FLA. STAT. § 456.072(1)(mm) (2014).
110
Supra Part I.
111
See Health & Human Servs. Comm., Fla. H.R. Staff Analysis, H.R. 0155C, at 2
(Apr. 7, 2011).
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There, a pediatrician asked a patient’s mother whether there were
firearms in her home. When she refused to answer, the doctor advised
her that she had thirty days to find a new pediatrician, and that he asks all
of his patients about their firearm ownership in order to provide safety
advice. After receiving much media attention, the incident in Ocala “led
many to question whether it should be an accepted practice for a doctor
to inquire about a patient’s firearm ownership.” 112 As noted in the
District Court Opinion, many physicians groups encourage inquiry into
patients’ firearm ownership. 113 According to legislative findings, the
American Medical Association recommends its members inquire as to
the presence of firearms in the home and educate patients on the dangers
of firearms to children. 114 Further, the Legislature found the American
Academy of Pediatrics recommends physicians include questions about
firearms in their patient history taking. 115
During the legislative drafting process of the Firearm Owners
Privacy Act, the bill went through a series of revisions. The first
Committee Substitute of the original bill in the Florida House of
Representatives contained language pertaining to both the mental health
of the patient and whether the possession of firearms would pose an
imminent danger to the patient or others. The bill read:
(6)
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
section, it is not a violation for:
(a) Any psychiatrist as defined in s. 394.455,
psychologist as defined in s. 490.003, school
psychologist as defined in s. 490.003, clinical social
worker as defined in s. 491.003, or public or private
physician, nurse, or other medical personnel to make
an inquiry prohibited by paragraph (1)(a) if the
person making the inquiry in good faith believes that
the possession or control of a firearm or ammunition
by the patient or another member of the patient’s
household would pose an imminent danger or threat
to the patient or others.
(b) Any public or private physician, nurse, or other
medical personnel to make an inquiry prohibited by
paragraph (1)(a) if such inquiry is necessary to treat
112
113
114
115

Id.
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
Crim. Justice Comm., Fla. H.R. Staff Analysis, H.R. 0155, at 2 (Mar. 4, 2011).
Id.
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a patient during the course and scope of a medical
emergency which specifically includes, but is not
limited to, a mental health or psychotic episode
where the patient’s conduct or symptoms reasonably
indicate that the patient has the capacity of causing
harm to himself, herself, or others.
(c) Any public or private physician, nurse, or other
medical personnel to enter any of the information
disclosed pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b) into any
record, whether written or electronic.116
Notably, subsection (6)(a) requires a good faith belief that possession of
a firearm would pose an imminent danger, and not just a vague good
faith belief that possession of a firearm would be relevant to a patient’s
medical care or safety. 117
Further, although subsection (b) specifies that it is not limited to
mental health or psychotic episodes, their specific mention is telling of
the drafters’ intent. It was wise, though, to not limit the exception only to
mental health or psychotic episodes. The House of Representatives’ Staff
Analysis points out that “[i]n certain instances, questions about gun
ownership may be necessary to the treatment of a patient (e.g.,
psychiatrists treating suicidal patients, emergency room physicians
treating gun shot victims who need to know the type, caliber, etc. of
firearm and ammunition used, etc.).” 118 Stated differently, the legislative
history indicates that, to be relevant to a patient’s treatment, the dangers
associated with gun ownership must be concrete, not abstract or
hypothetical.
In fact, the first Committee Substitute of the bill explained abstract
conceptions of danger do not satisfy the requirements for the exception.
Following subsection (6) above, a hanging paragraphing stated:
However, a patient’s response to any inquiry permissible
under this subsection shall be private and may not be
disclosed to any third party not participating in the
treatment of the patient other than a law enforcement
officer conducting an active investigation involving the
patient or the events giving rise to a medical emergency.
The exceptions provided by this subsection do not
116

Firearm Owners Privacy Act, H.R. 0155-01 (Fla. 2011).
Compare Firearm Owners Privacy Act, H.R. 0155-01 (Fla. 2011) with FLA. STAT.
§ 790.338(2) (2014).
118
Crim. Justice Comm., supra note 114, at 5.
117
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apply to inquiries made due to a person’s general
belief that firearms or ammunition are harmful to
health or safety. 119
The former sentence of the hanging paragraph protects patients from
disclosures such as those authorized under Section 456.057. 120 The latter
sentence clarifies what is meant by phrases such as “good faith
[belief] . . . would pose an imminent danger” and “necessary to treat a
patient during the course and scope of a medical emergency.”
Despite the clarity provided by these provisions, they were not
written into the final bill. Instead, the Legislature opted to use more
general language. The specific language may very well have been too
specific—information regarding firearm ownership or possession may be
relevant even though the threat or danger is not imminent. Nonetheless,
the unrefined language of the prior version of the bill provides valuable
insight into the true intent of the Legislature in passing the Firearm
Owners Privacy Act.

C. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida
After the district court enjoined the State of Florida from enforcing
several core provisions of the Firearm Owners Privacy Act, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding the law
facially violates the First Amendment and that the law is not
unconstitutionally vague. 121 Finding the law to be a legitimate regulation
of professional conduct, the Eleventh Circuit stated “[i]t is
uncontroversial that a state may police the boundaries of good medical
practice by routinely subjecting physicians to malpractice liability or
administrative discipline for all manner of activity that the state deems
bad medicine, much of which necessarily involves physicians speaking
to patients.” 122
Before addressing the law itself, the court discussed the need for the
law. It noted there is an imbalance of power in the doctor-patient
relationship. “When a patient enters a physician’s office, the patient
depends on the physician’s knowledge and submits to the physician’s
authority . . . . So when physicians inquire about the presence of firearms
119

Firearm Owners Privacy Act, H.R. 0155-01 (Fla. 2011) (emphasis added).
See supra Part II.C.2. The House of Representatives’ Staff Analysis acknowledges
HIPAA authorizes disclosure of protected health information to certain entities without a
waiver or authorization; therefore, if information relating to firearm ownership qualifies
as protected health information, the law would conflict with HIPAA. Crim. Justice
Comm., supra note 114, at 5.
121
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014).
122
Id. at 1203.
120
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in patients’ homes, some patients may feel that their physicians demand
an answer.” 123 Inside the examination room a patient may feel powerless
to deny the doctor an answer.
While the lion’s share of the decision discusses First Amendment
issues, this note will only address its discussion of vagueness. The
plaintiffs argued Sections 790.338(1)–(2) are vague because a
requirement that information be “relevant” to a patient’s medical care or
safety does not specify whether a physician must make a specific finding
of relevance for each patient, or whether the firearm information must be
relevant at the time of treatment or if future relevance is satisfactory. 124
Looking to the plain meaning of the word, the court defined “relevant” as
“[r]elated to the matter at hand; to the point; pertinent.” 125 Determination
of relevancy, according to the court, must be done on a case-by-case
basis. 126 To make that determination, the doctor must analyze
particularized information about the patient.127
The court points out that essential to the issue of relevancy is the
requirement that the doctor believe in good faith that firearm ownership
or possession is relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety. 128 But,
the justification the court provides in support of this proposition
seemingly detracts from the purpose of the law. The court reasoned,
Thus, a physician may make firearms inquiries of any or
all patients, so long as he or she does so with the good
faith belief—based on the specifics of the patient’s
case—that the inquiry is relevant to the patient’s medical
care or safety, or the safety of others.129
Taking this statement to the extreme, a physician could ask all patients of
a given demographic about their firearm ownership if he or she believes
that firearms ownership poses an inherent danger to members of that
demographic. Such interpretation of the law is untenable. The court
further explained that “[i]f . . . the physician seeks firearm information to
suit an agenda unrelated to medical care or safety, he or she would not be
making a ‘good faith’ inquiry.” 130 Although the court is correct in that
inquiring into firearm ownership for the purpose of promoting an agenda
123

Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1227.
125
Id. (quoting American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1098 (William
Morris, ed., 1969)) (alterations in original).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 1228.
128
Id.
129
Id..
130
Id.
124
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would be contrary to the law, it is unlikely that there will be such a clear
demarcation between promoting an agenda and acting on the belief that
is the core of the agenda. A doctor who would promote an agenda would
likely hold strong beliefs about the dangers of firearms. In making the
inquiry by virtue of the underlying belief, based on the Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion, the physician would be in accord with the law.
As for the phrase “unnecessarily harassing,” the court again looked
to the plain meaning of the words. It explained harass means “[t]o disturb
or irritate persistently.” 131 Similar to other parts of the law, this provision
is designed to prevent doctors from pursuing an agenda inside their
offices. The “unnecessarily harassing” provision “communicates that
health care providers should not disparage firearm-owning patients, and
should not continue over a patient’s objection or attempt to speak to the
patient about firearm ownership when not relevant to medical care or
safety.” 132 Additionally, the court explained the modifier “unnecessary”
“allows physicians the freedom to challenge—i.e., ‘harass’—patients
regarding firearms when doing so is necessary for health or safety
reasons if the patient might find the physicians’ advice unwelcome.” 133
This freedom is necessary for instances such as when a doctor is treating
a mentally unstable patient, and the patient objects to the doctor’s
inquiries. Not only do physicians have the defense that the harassment
was necessary, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that even if a patient
feels harassed, the patient cannot by himself or herself subject the doctor
to discipline. A patient can either file a complaint, which will then trigger
an investigation, or a civil malpractice action. Regardless, the doctor
need not fear an adverse judgment or professional discipline so long as
he or she was operating in good faith and the information was relevant
and necessary. 134
To be brief, the court held the record keeping, inquiry, and
harassment provisions not void for vagueness. It found “persons of
‘common intelligence’” would experience no difficulty in interpreting
and applying the law. 135

131

Id. at 1229 (alteration in original) (quoting American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 600).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
See id. at 1230.
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IV. LESS DISCRETION, MORE EFFECTIVE
From examining the legislative history of the Firearm Owners
Privacy Act, it is clear that the Legislature intended the exceptions in
Section 790.338 be construed narrowly. An expansive reading of these
exceptions, as done by the court in Wollschlaeger, would render the law
fruitless. In prior versions of the bill, the exceptions were formulated in
terms such as “imminent danger” and “mental health or psychotic
episode.” 136 By the law’s final passage, all references to the patient’s
mental health were removed and replaced with more general language
referring to the patient’s medical care or safety.
Even though the Legislature opted to remove the language pertaining
to mental health, a patient’s mental state should be a prominent factor in
determining the relevancy of information regarding firearm ownership or
possession. As previously mentioned, according to the Baker Act, mental
illness means “an impairment of the mental or emotional processes that
exercise conscious control of one’s actions or of the ability to perceive or
understand reality.” 137 This note posits that any person unable to exhibit
control over his or her actions or to properly perceive and understand
reality is a dangerous person. An innocuous gesture may be perceived as
a threat, and a threat, no matter how slight, may receive a
disproportionate response. Not only should healthcare providers have the
ability to question someone suffering from mental illness about
ownership or possession of firearms, it would be irresponsible and a
dereliction of duty to refrain from such inquiry. 138
In a like manner, the phrase “imminent danger” also places the
patient’s mental state under scrutiny, which could be inferred from
behavior. 139 However, a patient would not need to be mentally ill in order
to be in a mental state in which he or she poses an imminent danger to
himself or herself or others. For example, a patient in a state of rage,
although in control of his or her actions and able to perceive reality
normally, may pose an imminent threat to others.

136

See supra Part III.B.
FLA. STAT. § 394.455(18) (2014).
138
This note speaks only of those currently suffering from mental illness, and not of
people who were once deemed mentally ill but are now healthy. But see Tyler v.
Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The government’s interest
in keeping firearms out of the hands of the mentally ill is not sufficiently related to
depriving the mentally healthy, who had a distant episode of commitment, of their
constitutional rights”).
139
Assuming, arguendo, that the danger will be caused by the patient. Of course, the
patient may also be the victim of violence. Under those circumstances the existence of an
imminent danger would be evidenced by external factors.
137
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Being that both phrases from the prior version of the bill dealt with
the patient’s mental state, why then did the Legislature ultimately enact
Section 790.338(2) without any indicator that relevancy requires the
patient possess a particular mental state? As a reminder, the
Wollschlaeger court stated that a doctor may direct firearms inquiries
towards all patients, so long as the information is relevant, based on the
specifics of the case, to the patient’s medical care of safety. Despite not
being too vague for constitutional purposes, this interpretation of the law
leaves doctors with a healthy dose of discretion to apply their personal
beliefs regarding firearms to their relevancy determinations. Would
changing the language from “relevant to the patient’s medical care or
safety” strengthen Section 790.338(2) so that it better effectuates its
originally intended purpose?
With regards to the language of the law, there are several phrases
that the Legislature has previously considered that better tie in a mental
state component. Limiting inquiries only to times when there is
“imminent danger” creates risk because some dangers are foreseeable,
even probable, but not imminent. Likewise, a requirement that the patient
is mentally ill or experiencing a psychotic episode is too narrow. There
will be dangerous patients who are fully conscious of their actions and of
the world around them. In contrast to the Firearm Owners Privacy Act
and its legislative history, the Baker Act uses a combination of these
phrases as the criteria for involuntary examination. A patient may be
taken for involuntary examination if he or she is mentally ill and either
likely to suffer from neglect and such neglect poses a real and present
threat of substantial harm to his or her well-being, or there is substantial
likelihood that the patient will cause serious bodily harm to himself or
herself or others, as evidenced by recent behavior.140
Consider if, instead of its present form, Section 790.338(2) read in
part:
Notwithstanding this provision, a health care practitioner
or health care facility that in good faith believes that
there is a substantial likelihood that the ownership or
possession of a firearm or ammunition by the patient or
by a family member of the patient, or the presence of a
firearm in a private home or domicile of the patient or a
family member of the patient, will cause serious bodily
harm to the patient or others in the near future.
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By borrowing the language of the Baker Act, the Firearm Owners
Privacy Act would more clearly define what is necessary for the inquiry
to be relevant. Additionally, the language of the Baker Act is time-tested.
The aforementioned language has withstood judicial scrutiny for over
twenty-five years. 141
In light of the various terms so far discussed, the substantial
likelihood of harm exception used in the Baker Act is relatively strong. It
does not require a weighing of probabilities, nor is it activated by a mere
possibility of harm. However, it has its limitations. As written, this
exception is forward-looking only. If a patient presents with a gunshot
wound, information on the caliber and type of ammunition would likely
aid the treating physician. Section 790.338(3) creates an exception to the
general rule for such medical emergencies, but the exception only applies
to emergency medical technicians and paramedics. Therefore, in order
for the language derived from the Baker Act to be workable, Section
790.338(3) would also need to be amended to expand its scope from
emergency services workers to all healthcare providers.
While these changes would make the Firearm Owners Privacy Act
more effective, less invasive changes may be sufficient. To reiterate, the
problem with the law as currently enacted is that the relevancy inquiry
leaves physicians too much leeway. If the amount of discretion
physicians have in making the relevancy determination could be limited,
the law would be more effective. The law could be improved by
amending the previously mentioned subsections. But, there is an
alternative path that offers less resistance. In lieu of revising substantial
portions of the law, the Legislature should reinstate that portion of the
hanging paragraph that excludes from the exception those inquiries made
due to a general belief that firearms or ammunition are dangerous.
When the law was originally drafted in the Legislature, it had a
purpose. Now it is better written, but to do that, the exceptions were
broadened. The phrase “relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety”
creates a sensible exception, yet gives doctors the ability to exploit a
loophole. With this loophole, physicians with an understanding of the
law can act in large part as if Section 790.338(2) does not exist.
Wollschlaeger states that relevancy must be determined on a case-bycase basis upon particularized information. Other than that, there is no
explicit limitation of what type of information will suffice for that
determination. If the Legislature added language to indicate that “the
exceptions provided by Section 790.338(2) do not apply to inquiries
made due to a person’s general belief that firearms or ammunition are
harmful to health or safety,” the excessive amount of discretion held by
141
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physicians would be reduced. Thus, it would not fall within the exception
for a physician to inquire as to firearm ownership for patients given his
or her belief that the patient is part of an at-risk demographic.
In short, the Firearm Owners Privacy Act would be most improved
by amending Section 790.338 so that the exception to the general
prohibition against inquiries concerning firearm ownership would require
a good faith belief that there is a substantial likelihood of serious bodily
harm to the patient or others in the near future. By making substantial
likelihood of serious bodily harm a sine qua non to the exception, clever
physicians will be less able to pursue an agenda under the pretext of
preventive medicine. If, on the other hand, the Legislature were to find
that such a change would be too radical, the law could still be improved
by merely adding an explanation that to be relevant, more is necessary
than a general belief that firearms are dangerous.

V. CONCLUSION
Certainly, patients benefit when they can enter a physician’s
examination room without fear of being harassed or being subject to a
political agenda. Likewise, physicians have responsibilities that will, at
times, require them to broach sensitive subjects. The Florida Firearm
Owners Privacy Act recognizes this dichotomy by both explicitly
granting patients a right to privacy in regards to their firearm ownership
and possession, and by carving out exceptions for when that information
is pertinent to treatment.
That said, the exceptions are broader than are necessary for
physicians to provide adequate treatment. Amending the law to phrase
the exceptions in more specific language will serve to better effectuate
the law’s purpose by raising the threshold for which the information is
deemed relevant. What the law should advise the healthcare consuming
public and physicians alike is that firearm ownership is not intrinsically a
cause for medical concern. Only when there is an antecedent medical
diagnosis or indication that a patient may be harmed or harm others, or
during the course of a medical emergency, should a physician ever
inquire into firearm ownership or possession.
Earlier, this note mentioned that the federal government regulates
healthcare in some ways through Medicare.142 Currently, the federal
government has no regulations in place that either prohibit or compel
inquiry into firearm ownership. Nonetheless, the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services contends, “nothing in [the Affordable Care Act]
prohibits or otherwise limits communication between health care
142

Supra Part II.A.2.

480

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:451

professionals and their patients, including communications about
firearms. Health care providers can play an important role in promoting
gun safety.” 143 This is the sentiment that precipitated the need for the
Firearm Owners Privacy Act. Florida took the initiative to protect the
privacy rights of patients, which in turn improves access to and usage of
healthcare. Let Florida’s system serve as a roadmap for other states that
wish to put patient care above politics.
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